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How does one live according to reason if the other, the alien, the foreigner, 
whether remote or nearby, may burst into one’s world at any moment? 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of 
International Relations 293 
We have become accustomed to viewing and thinking of North Korea, and 
inter-Korean relations, in terms of realpolitik. The uncertain security situation 
in the Korean peninsula — not least because of the secrecy and difficulty of 
knowing the intentions of the North Korean leadership — tends to determine a 
materialist and rationalist analysis driven by the assumption that both South 
and North Korea seek security at all costs. Lankov,1 for example, understands 
the North Korean leadership as adopting a ‘survival strategy’, and describes 
them as ‘remarkably efficient and cold-minded calculators, perhaps the best 
                                                 
* Lecturer, Deakin University; Barrister, Victorian Bar. 
1 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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practitioners of Machiavellian politics that can be found in the modern 
world’2 who, given the present situation (a poor, under-resourced nation with 
few international friends, and no means of sustaining its economy) seek to 
‘stay in control and protect ... their property’.3  
Danielle L Chubb, in Contentious Activism and Inter-Korean Relations, 
(‘Contentious Activism’) contests the view that understanding the Korean 
peninsula requires its politics to be framed in the security terms of strategic 
studies, and to be determined by the relationship between domestic and 
international politics, which is state-centric and rationalist. Further, Chubb 
challenges the cognitive hegemony of the military focus of power politics 
which has become the horizon to which all other perspectives on North Korea 
and inter-Korean politics have been assimilated. Contentious Activism is not 
an attempt to overturn rationalist accounts and analyses completely. Indeed, a 
number of leading studies of North Korea confirm the continued validity of 
viewing it in Washington-centric terms. This is understandable given the 
reality of the contained hostility of the world’s most tense border, and the 
productive leveraging of this premise in successful negotiations such as the 
‘Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of 
America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ for the 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, negotiated by the Clinton 
Administration. 
From this perspective the most pertinent questions are the following. Can the 
North be normalised and incorporated into the international system of states? 
What, if anything, can be done of facilitate this (or should the world simply 
wait for its inevitable collapse)? And, then, what sort of normality would the 
North assume — South Korean entrepreneurial, or Chinese state-run, 
capitalism? These are not, however, the central questions of inter-Korean 
relations (or, at least, not the form they currently assume), nor do rationalist 
approaches adequately account for those relations. As Chubb argues, ‘[t]he 
pursuit of justice is at the very core of inter-Korean relations’. The South 
Korean discourse of the peninsula exceeds mere pragmatic, realist security 
concerns, and involves ‘a deep sense of responsibility and obligation’.4  
For Chubb, power alone (at least a homogeneously conceived power) is not 
sufficient to explain South Korean activism in relation to inter-Korean 
relations. In this she echoes Martin Wight,5 who, in discussing diplomacy’s 
                                                 
2 Ibid xii. 
3 Ibid xiii. 
4 Danielle L Chubb, Contentious Activism and Inter-Korean Relations (Columbia University 
Press, 2014) 9. 
5 Martin Wight, Power Politics (A & C Black, 2002) 94. 
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relation to power, maintains that power is always linked to systems of belief, 
and is exercised according to the strengths of those beliefs. The interest that 
power serves must therefore be considered within the context of the 
geopolitical zone, the historical frame in which it operates, and in relation to 
its agents. For Chubb, inter-Korean relations must be studied through a lens 
sensitive to the detailed and nuanced interactions between political power and 
social norms. Without such a perspective, it is not possible to understand why 
the self-interest of South Korean activists goes beyond material survival, and 
beyond the political zero sum game, to consider ‘the greater good of the 
Korean peninsula as their most cherished goal’.6  
The particular norms on which South Korean activism centres are: unification, 
human rights in North Korea, and democratisation. Each has implications for 
inter-Korean relations. The normative discourse of South Korean political 
activists historicises agency so that Korean identity, and inter-Korean policy 
and security concerns, can be negotiated. Under the paradigm of a deliberative 
politics,7 the two Koreas enter into relations not as complete identities, but 
socially, as entities undergoing construction through social and discursive 
processes. Security does not precede discussions about unification either, 
because the prospect of unification modifies threat perception and adjusts the 
cost-benefit analysis. Further, the prospect for unification is both anchored in 
Korean history, and dependent on how the two Koreas currently perceive each 
other. Because of the potential for relieving security threats through normative 
debates concerning unification, deliberation becomes central to justice.  
Importantly, normative debate represents the possibility of overcoming the 
determinations of history. Were it otherwise there would be little reason for 
optimism (or debate) regarding unification. It is well to remember that the 
Korean War that ended in 1953 concluded not with a treaty but merely a 
ceasefire, which nevertheless the South refused to sign for the reason, 
amongst others, that to do so would be to recognise the North’s statehood. 
While the South’s two most significant leaders — Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun (together 1998–2007) — forged their political identities as 
activists pursuing unification, Pyongyang’s official aim has always been to 
destabilise the South in order to bring about its conversion to a Communist 
state, by establishing an underground guerrilla resistance led by North Korean 
commandos. It even formed the Revolutionary Party of Unification in Seoul 
in 1964 to contest local elections before the Party was eventually outlawed by 
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the South Korean authorities, and some of its leaders executed, while the 
remainder of those unable to flee were gaoled for long terms.8  
Whether or not deliberative politics can overcome historical mistrust and 
mutual suspicion, another problem is ‘the slow motion decline of the once 
universal enthusiasm for unification’.9 The ideological basis of unification 
debates has withered and been replaced by pragmatic market economy 
oriented analyses.10 Where once the discussion centred on the form 
unification should take — South Korean rightists preferring a capitalist liberal 
model –— more recently consideration has turned to the price of unification. 
The vast differences between North and South suggest that unification would 
simply drain the South of wealth with the needy North bringing little to the 
table of union. Furthermore, public discourse, which continues to reflect the 
idea of the manifest destiny of national reconciliation, is not matched by 
private beliefs (as measured in opinion polls) The reason is that the so called 
‘386 generation’ (in their 30s in the 90s; who matured politically in the 80s; 
and were born in the 60s) does not view unification as a natural completion of 
historical kinship. Instead, they experience the North as an alien and 
enigmatic enemy. 
They have a point. North Korea is exceptional not in its having a 
charismatically based political leadership, but in its longevity, and cross 
generational survival.11 Obvious and important questions arise, such as how 
North Korea can engage in diplomacy when the basis of political and social 
order is dependent on hereditary power going unquestioned, and the cult of 
personality is harnessed to ensure the continuity of established order. If South 
Korean activist discourse is dependent on historicising monolithic concepts 
such as security, and the state, North Korea’s depends on its remaining frozen 
in time. How too can a populace with no history of influence, which has never 
engaged in self-determination, imagine alternatives to its current existence?12  
The attempts by the South Korean leadership to address these issues have 
fallen short of the standard required by ethical activism. An example is the 
infamous Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, based on the 
wisdom of Aesop’s fable concerning the contest between the sun and the 
north wind. Its premise was that it would be easier to warm North Korea into 
removing its isolationist protective armour than to try to blow this armour off 
                                                 
8 Lankov, above n 1, 29. 
9 Ibid 161.  
10 Ibid 161–2. 
11 See Heonik Kwan and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics 
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it by force. The policy in fact promoted a resistance to investigating the 
North’s human rights abuses on the basis of the adverse effect it would have 
on inter-Korean relations and the threat to the security of the peninsula. 
Tolerating the status quo merely supported the furtherance of human rights 
abuses by a corrupt regime. The policy also produced some bizarre and 
annoying concessions on the part of South Korea — such as Kim Jong Ill 
being given $500 million to agree to meet Kim Dae Jung in the first summit 
between the countries. Jung received the Nobel Peace Prize which his political 
opponents criticised as (literally) purchased for too high a price. 
Chubb accepts that South Korea is an authoritarian state in which public 
debate is structured divisively between dominant and dissident discourses, and 
which offers restricted opportunities for activism.13 Further, she accepts that 
any deliberative space is an already structured hierarchy in which 
authoritarian is dominant over activist, and hegemonic over dissident. 
Nevertheless, she argues that South Korean activists advance frameworks for 
understanding inter-Korean issues, and that these frameworks are able to 
effect public debate because they are promoted as better moral (not objective) 
frameworks for understanding. She describes these frameworks as a vision of 
justice framed by ideology. While the state may determine the boundaries of 
meaning, and what counts as appropriate discourse, marginalised discourses 
still have an agenda-setting and policy-orienting power. That power emerges 
from the history of struggles for meaning over human rights, democracy and 
unification during which the contentious activism of South Korean political 
activists helped shape the political and ideational environment of 
contemporary South Korea.14  
Identifying the contours of the political debate in South Korea, and the 
contribution of marginal activism to it, requires a novel methodology. Chubb 
adopts an historical and historical–change perspective which periodises South 
Korean political history into the Kwangju period, the emergence of 
democracy, the 1990s as a period of political reorientation, and the Sunshine 
era. The arguments made by activists within those periods are traced, in order 
to follow their normative impacts over time, which impacts are sometimes 
evident in explicit pronouncements, and sometimes embedded in discourses 
requiring unearthing. Ultimately it is the South Korean activists who 
understand the Korean peninsula as an essentially alienated place. For Chubb 
those activists approach inter-Korean relations through a process of norm 
negotiation. In a term coined by James Der Dorian, it is a form of 
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‘diplomacy’, which undertakes a mediation between peoples who have 
become historically estranged from each other.15 
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